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During the first seven years of the Reagan administration, the kinds 
of justification publicly adduced by U.S. officials for their government's 
support for the State of Israel shifted significantly from the moral 
reasoning that had previously prevailed in U.S. public discourse, toward 
a cluster of strategic justifications. This shift in the official rhetoric was 
accompanied, furthermore, by concrete policy moves which tied the 
defense structures of the two countries much closer together than ever 
before. Most prominent among these moves was the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on strategic cooperation, concluded between the 
two sides in November 1981. (The MOU was suspended by the American 
side after Israel extended its jurisdiction into the occupied Golan Heights 
in December 1981; but it was reinstated in late 1983). The MOU was 
followed by a number of other agreements of significant security-related 
agreements, such as Israel's 1986 inclusion in the Strategic Defense In-
itiative (SDI) research program, and the Reagan administration's 
designation of Israel, in late 1987, as "a major non-NATO ally". 
In the last year of Reagan's term, the eruption and continuation of 
the Palestinian intifada (uprising) in the West Bank and Gaza, and more 
particularly the means by which the Israelis tried to end it, provoked a 
wave of soul-searching in many sectors of the American public, including 
the American Jewish community. In many of the discussions that 
resulted, the moral content of the United States' ties to Israel re-emerged 
as a theme of major public concern. Despite this new climate of public 
opinion, however, and despite the administration's identification of a 
major disagreement with the Israeli government over the applicability of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, strategic collaboration 
continued on its previous course during 1988. Indeed, while the disagree-
ment over Resolution 242 was at its sharpest, in the spring of that year, a 
Memorandum of Agreement was signed simultaneously in Washington 
and Jerusalem that codified and further institutionalized the existing 
strategic agreements between the two states. ' 
The shift in the foundation of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, from 
one based primarily on moral considerations on the U.S. side to one bas-
ed on strategic considerations, provoked significant debate inside Israel. 
There, several analysts openly queried the value to their country of too 
close an alignment with the United States in general, or with the strategic 
agenda of the Reagan administration in particular. In the United States, 
by contrast, the claims of those who vaunted Israeli's contribution to 
U.S. national security met with little serious or informed comment in the 
public arena. This allowed a situation to develop in which those inside 
the U.S. administration—and under Reagan they were many—who had 
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a strong interest in building up the Israeli military-industrial complex 
were able to pursue this aim at the U.S. taxpayer's expense, remarkably 
free of serious oversight. Meanwhile, the possible costs to U.S. national 
security inherent in this situation were only infrequently subject to 
systematic public examination.1 
What follows, then, is an attempt first to chart the shift in the nature 
of the U.S. tie to Israel, from one based primarily on moral considera-
tions to one based on strategic arguments; then to assess the arguments 
of Israel's 'strategic salesmen' in the United Stated by reference to, 
among other sources, some portions of the strategic debate within Israel 
itself; and finally to examine the change in the political dynamic of the 
U.S.-Israeli relationship that resulted from the shift to a 'strategy-based' 
link. 
Part 1: The Shift from the Moral to the Strategic Basis 
for the Relationship 
The shift in U.S. declaratory policy whereby the nature of the rela-
tionship with Israel came increasingly to be described in terms of Israel's 
strategic worth to the United States, did not start with the Reagan ad-
ministration, though it was greatly intensified during those years. 
Previous traces of a similar shift can be identified as early as the period 
immediately following that June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Political scientist 
Steven Spiegel has noted of U.S. attitudes in that period, that, 
conservatives and military officials became more sym-
pathetic to the Israelis . . . The Israelis were now 
positively contributing to U.S. security: their combat 
experience and capture of Russian equipment provided 
information important to the American military in Viet-
nam . . . Israeli's new conservative sympathizers were 
more likely [than its previous more liberal supporters] to 
agree with its military approach to conducting foreign 
policy and with the need for advanced weaponry.' 
It was against this background that President Lyndon Johnson 
secretly approved an increased exchange of intelligence with the Israelis. 
In early 1968, the Israelis stepped up their requests for U.S. military 
technology. In order to help argue their case for Johnson's approval of 
the sale of Phantom (F-4) fighter planes, they sent as Ambassador to 
Washington their former chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin: this choice sym-
bolized the change in the tenor of the bilateral link. That October, 
Johnson decided to approve the Phantom sale. Amidst the pro-Israeli 
rhetoric generated by the U.S. presidential election of that year, he spell-
ed out that he would not ask for any of the quid pro quos such as Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied Arab areas, or Israeli agreement to sign 
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, that were being urged on him by 
his Secretaries of State and Defense.4 
Under President Richard Nixon, the receptivity of the two govern-
ments to each other's strategic arguments deepened. Nixon's 
speechwriter, William Safire, wrote later of Nixon's, "admiration for 
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the nationalism and guts of the Israelis."5 Steven Spiegel noted that, 
"The Israelis reciprocated with a genuine admiration for Nixon as the 
first president who looked on them as a strategic advantage for American 
interests. Naturally, they preferred to be an asset rather than a ward."6 
In this atmosphere of growing mutual strategic admiration, U.S. 
military aid to Israel made two signficant upward steps under Nixon. The 
first of these occurred in Fiscal Year (FY) 1971, when military aid (loans 
plus grants) increased from less than $100 million per year to an annual 
level higher than $300 million. Three years later, the level of military aid 
leaped again in the aftermath of the 1973 Middle East war. Over the 
three years FY 1974 through FY 1976, the average annual level of military 
aid rose above $1.4 billion.7 
Under President Gerald Ford, the level of military aid was brought 
back to $1.0 billion a year from FY1977 on. But more power in foreign 
policy decision-making was meanwhile devolving onto Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger, who proved himself eager to maximize Israel's strategic 
value to the United States. It was during Kissinger's 'vicardom' of U.S. 
foreign policy that the U.S. and Israel started holding regular (though 
still sub-ministerial) meetings on strategic issues. According to the Direc-
tor of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessments, Andrew Marshall, it 
was "in the mid-'seventies" that the Israelis requested the opening of 
high-level channels between the Pentagon and their Ministry of Defense 
to discuss strategic planning. Periodic meetings between the two sides 
started in 1976, while the Labor-led coalition was still in office in Israel 
and Ford was President of the United States.1 
President Jimmy Carter came into office in January 1977 with an at-
titude that was very supportive of Israel. But, in a break from the views 
of his predecessors, Carter's attitude stemmed more than the traditional 
moral justifications for supporting Israel than from full-scale endorse-
ment of Israel's strategic claims.9 Under Carter, military aid to Israel was 
kept at the $1.0 billion mark—except for the single year 1979 when, in 
conjunction with the conclusion of the Camp David accords, the ad-
ministration requested and received an additional $3.0 billion from Con-
gress, which was earmarked for construction of Israel's new military air-
bases in the Negev.10 
The contrast between Carter's view of Israel and that of his suc-
cessor was stark. In an article published in August 1979, Ronald Reagan 
wrote of, "Israel's geopolitical importance as a . . . military offset to 
the Soviet Union," and of its value, "as perhaps the only remaining 
strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely." 
The future president concluded that, "Only by full appreciation of the 
critical role the State of Israel plays in our strategic calculus can we build 
the foundation for thwarting Moscow's designs on territories and 
resources vital to our security and our national wellbeing."" 
President Reagan's policies after coming into office were in line with 
this rhetoric. The wording of the above article, moreover, reflected a 
theme that was strongly evident throughout the first years of his 
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administration: namely, Reagan's tendency to view the Middle East (like 
all other regional issues) primarily through the prism of the East-West 
conflict. To this theme was added an emphasis on the threat posed by 
"international terrorism", which was magnified after the President was 
injured in an assassination attempt in Washington D.C. ten weeks after 
he took office. The perceived strength of the terrorist threat served to in-
crease the value of strategic cooperation with an Israel that had won 
world renown for its counter-terrorist efforts. 
Reagan's predilection for viewing Israel as a strategic asset was rein-
forced by many of the first people he appointed to top positions. His 
Vice President George Bush had stated during the 1980 campaign that, 
"It is in the strategic interest of the United States to maintain Israel's 
strength and security".12 His first national security advisor, Richard V. 
Allen, had previously given a warm endorsement to the writings of the 
hawkish and pro-Israeli defense analyst Joseph Churba. His Secretary of 
State, Alexander M. Haig, was later to be described by The Jerusalem 
Post's Wolf Blitzer as "a pro-Israel advocate in the administration"." 
Haig viewed as his first goal in the Middle East the creation of an 
American-Israeli-Arab 'strategic consensus' that would confront the 
Soviet Union there. When it became clear that the Arabs would not enter 
into such an arrangement alongside Israel, and that they gave priority to 
regional, rather than East-West threats, he became the architect of the 
bilateral U.S.-Israeli 'Memorandum of Understanding* on strategic 
cooperation (MOU) that was concluded in November 1981. To represent 
the United States at the United Nations, Reagan chose Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick, who in 1982 described herself as, "a very good friend of 
Israel", and reassured her American Jewish audience that, "There are a 
good many of us throughout the administration, beginning at the top."14 
The sole doubter at cabinet level was, by all accounts, Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger. It was not that he was soft on the core issue 
of 'the Soviet threat'. Far from it. But his view, which was reinforced by 
a great part of the institutional wisdom within both his own department 
and the State Department, was reportedly that countries such as Turkey, 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia could, given their size and location, make a 
greater contribution to sustaining the U.S. defense posture in the Middle 
East than could Israel." 
Part 2: The Strategic Relationship Takes Shape 
The Reagan administration's path toward the establishment of 
strategic links with Israel was not to be all smooth. Already, before the 
conclusion of the 1981 MOU, the administration had several intimations 
that its dealings with Israel might not be easy. In June 1981, Israeli F-16s 
recently supplied by the United States bombed the Iraqi nuclear facility 
in Baghdad, in apparent contravention of U.S. legislation governing 
arms transfers abroad. The following month, the IAF used other 
U.S.-supplied planes to bomb targets in Beirut. And in September 1981, 
Israeli Premier Menachem Begin outraged Reagan and embarrassed 
Haig, when, during a state visit to Washington planned as a U.S.-Israeli 
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lovefest, he campaigned publicly in Congress and the press against the 
administration's plan to sell AW ACS early-warning aircraft to Saudi 
Arabia." 
The administration continued to fight for Congressional support of 
the AW ACS sale; and in October, it won by a Senate vote of 52-48. The 
Israelis were quick to salvage what they could from their defeat: it was 
partially as a "compensation award' to them for having lost the AW ACS 
battle that the administration the following month responded to urgings 
from Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to conclude the MOU." 
Since the administration's earliest weeks in office, Haig and some of 
his staff in the State Department had reportedly been considering for-
malizing the strategic discussions with Israel that had continued since 
1976. Once former official close to this endeavor recalled that, while it 
was the Israeli side that provided the original push for formalization, 
"NSC and State came to feel that the American side should agree to this, 
because formalization would help to get the Pentagon on board."11 In 
April 1981, Haig held extensive talks with Premier Begin in Israel. In 
September 1981, State Department Counsellor Robert C. McFarlane had 
travelled to Israel and Egypt as Haig's envoy, to conduct talks on 
strategic issues in both countries. Egypt's President Sadat was killed the 
following month; in the view of many of the American officials involved, 
this development only magnified the urgency of reaching a strategic 
agreement with the Israelis. 
When the MOU was finally concluded, at a meeting between Sharon 
and Weinberger in Washington at the end of November, it spelled out 
that the planned strategic cooperation was designed against, "the threat 
to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-
controlled forces from outside the region introduced into the region." It 
provided for joint military exercises, including naval and air exercises in 
the eastern Mediterranean Sea, cooperation for the establishment and 
maintenance of joint readiness activities, and the establishment of a joint 
supervisory council, whose meetings were to be chaired when possible by 
the Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Defense." In an interview 
broadcast by Jerusalem radio the next morning, Sharon opined that, 
"Israel got most of what it wanted through this agreement".20 
Some American supporters of the MOU hoped that its conclusion 
might help to rein Israel in from taking the kind of rash actions that 
could de-stablize American interests in the Middle East. But they were 
soon to be proven wrong. On December 14, Premier Begin tabled the 
resolution in the Israeli Knesset that extended Israeli law to the occupied 
Golan Heights. Four days after the resolution was passed, the State 
Department announced the suspension—but not the cancellation—of the 
MOU. Begin's counter-response was tough. Calling in U.S. Ambassador 
Samuel Lewis, he read him a vituperative lecture asking, "What kind of 
talk is this, 'punishing Israel'? Are we a vassal state of yours? Are we a 
banana republic?"2' 
Thus ended the first, abortive phase of formal strategic cooperation. 
However, once the dust had settled from the Golan affair, relations soon 
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got back to a working footing. The Americans were particularly grateful 
to the Israelis that in April 1982, they completed the final stage of the 
withdrawal from Sinai that was a cornerstone of the Camp David ac-
cords. Sharon visited the United States in May 1982 where, according to 
the respected Israeli writers Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, he gave 
undeniable hints to Haig that the expected Israeli action in Lebanon 
might go well beyond merely striking at the PLO." Begin was scheduled 
to follow him in June. 
In early June, Begin and Sharon presented the United States with 
another bombshell, in the form of their massive invasion of Lebanon. 
Ze'ev Schiff wrote that, at last-minute Israeli cabinet meetings held 
before the invasion was launched, "It was clear to many Israeli ministers 
that based on what Washington was saying behind the scenes—unlike 
what it was saying in public—Israeli was already assured of U.S. sup-
port."23 Haig, whose position within the administration had been 
seriously eroding since early spring, hotly denied that any green light had 
been given to Israel. However, his own record of the position he took in 
the spring 1982 meetings with the Israelis could very well have been open 
to such an interpretation from that audience.24 Seasoned Israeli analyst 
Zvi Lanir later commented that the Reagan administration, "did not 
realize its own responsibility in the affair. Israel went to war only after its 
leaders felt they had received American permission to do so." He ex-
plained that ever since the war of 1973 had brought home to Israelis the 
extent of their dependence on the United States, Israeli leaders would not 
take a war decision without getting an advance "blessing" from the 
Americans. *' 
As the IDF became bogged down around Beirut in late June, the 
Reagan administration became rent by a visceral split over the issue. This 
pitted Haig against national security adviser William Clark (who had 
replaced Richard Allen in January 1982)—as well as against influential 
White House insiders like Vice President George Bush and Chief of Staff 
James Baker. Clark, who favored a tougher American attitude toward 
the Israeli action, won out over Haig in the last week of June, and on 
June 25 Reagan announced Haig's resignation. 
Haig was replaced as Secretary of State by George Schultz, who had 
been Labor Secretary and Secretary of the Treasury under Nixon, and 
since then had been a top executive with the Bechtel Corporation. The 
circumstances of Shultz' arrival at State, his expertise in the field of 
labour negotiating, and his business experience in the Arab world, were 
taken as indications that he might stand up to the Israelis much more 
than his predecessor. Certainly, his first few weeks in office seemed to 
bear out that speculation. The Israelis were forced to allow the PLO 
forces to make a peaceful exit from Beirut carrying sidearms. The U.S. 
government produced the first comprehensive statement of its position 
on settling the Arab-Israeli conflict ever issued explicitly in the 
President's name, which notably did not endorse Israel's claims to 
sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza. And—following the revelation 
of September's refugee camp massacres in Beirut—the United States 
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peremptorily ordered the Israelis to withdraw from the city, interposing a 
Multi-National Force (MNF) of U.S. and West European troops between 
the IDF and the city. 
Over the seven months that followed September 1982, however, 
Shultz' resolve to carry out a U.S. interests-centered policy—whether in 
Lebanon, or on the Arab-Israeli peace issue—eroded badly; and one of 
the interesting questions concerning U.S. policy toward Israel in the 
Reagan era focuses on how this came about. Some pro-Israeli analysts 
described what happened as the 'return to realism' of a policy that, at the 
time of the Reagan plan's announcement, had been fundamentally 
unrealistic." One such analyst, Martin Indyk, produced a list of addi-
tional factors that had led to Shultz' turnaround. This list, probably cor-
rectly, included the American consideration that, "at the end of 1982, 
Congress made clear that it would not support a campaign of diplomatic 
pressure [against Israel]." Indyk also mentioned the effect on Shultz of 
the replacement of Begin and Sharon by Yitzhak Shamir and Moshe 
Arens as Israel's Premier and Defense Minister, respectively." One fur-
ther factor was the influence on the new Secretary of a number of key 
pro-Israeli aides in the State Department: an especially crucial role in this 
respect was played, according to several administration insiders, by 
Under-Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger." 
Whatever his motives, by April 1983 Shultz had decided to cut a deal 
with the Israelis over Lebanon that ignored Syria's strategic concerns 
there completely. This decision, and the U.S.-Israeli-Lebanese agreement 
that resulted on May 17th, defused the brewing confrontation between 
the United States and Israel. What it did not achieve was any stablization 
of the situation in Lebanon, where the Syrians were able to provide sup-
port for the many local opponents of the agreement. In October 1983, 
one group of local dissidents, thought to be a radical Shiite grouplet, or-
chestrated a devastating truck-bomb attack against the Marines barracks 
in Beirut that killed 241 Marines. 
The ability of the Reagan administration to react effectively to this 
challenge was constrained, at the military level, by the reluctance of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) to commit any more forces to a mission in 
Lebanon that they already considered dangerously ill-defined.29 At the 
political level, the American reaction was more clearcut. A bare six days 
after the explosion, President Reagan signed National Security Decision 
Directive 111 (NSDD-111), which reinstated the concept of strategic col-
laboration with Israel. Two days after the NSDD was signed in 
Washington, Eagleburger was sent to Israel to discuss it with the new 
Israeli Premier, Yitzhak Shamir. Eagleburger reportedly told his host 
that, "the president wanted to discuss strategic cooperation in Lebanon, 
in the Middle East generally, and everywhere." In what was described as 
"a kind of political down payment", Eagleburger reportedly informed 
the Israelis that part of the $1.7 billion they were now receiving annually 
in military aid could henceforth be spent on developing the Lavi jet-
fighter, rather than—as is normally the case with American Foreign 




The October 1983 NSDD provided a much more durable basis for 
the development of U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation than its precursor 
of 1981. When Premier Shamir visited Washington in November, the 
two sides agreed to the establishment of a new, formal Joint Political-
Military Group (JPMG) that would convene every six months. President 
Reagan announced that the JPMG would, "give priority to our mutual 
interests posed by increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East. 
Among the specific areas to be considered are combined planning, joint 
exercises, and requirements for prepositioning of U.S. equipment in 
Israel."3' 
The JPMG held its first meeting in January 1984, and over the next 
four years its achievements in shepherding increased strategic coopera-
tion appeared impressive. Naval vessels from the U.S. Sixth Fleet started 
making regular port calls to Haifa; the United States leased 25 Kfir C-l 
fighters from Israel to simulate Soviet MiG planes in combat training; 
fleets from the two countries held joint anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
maneuvers and passing exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean; Sixth 
Fleet aviators conducted bombing practice against targets in Israel's 
Negev Desert; several squadrons of USAF F-16s were deployed in Israel 
for joint exercises with the Israeli Air Force. In May 1986, Israel became 
the third country, after Britain and West Germany, to sign on to the SDI 
research and development program; the FY 1987 DoD budget bill 
reportedly authorized about $70 million for prepositioning American 
war material in Israel; and in July 1986, Israel agreed to the installation 
of Voice of America transmitters which would beam American program-
ming into the southern parts of the Soviet Union." 
The total volume of FMS aid to Israel rose only slightly in the wake 
of the October 1983 decision, from $1.7 billion in the FY 83 budget, to a 
constant annual level of $1.8 billion in the latter half of the decade. 
However, the Israeli military establishment extracted clear benefits from 
four other developments in the U.S. military aid program in the post-
NSDD era. First, the proportion of FMS funds given as grant aid, rather 
than as a loan, was raised from a pre-NSDD level of 40-50 percent to a 
full 100 percent. Second, a clearly defined and larger share of the FMS 
funds could now be spent on 'offshore procurement*, that is, pruchases 
from the Israeli defense industry (in the FY 1988 budget this amount was 
$400 million). Third, a further part of each FMS grant, totaling $150 
million in each of the FY 88 and FY 89 budgets, was designated as 
'directed offsets', forcing U.S. contractors supplying Israel to spend that 
amount on purchases of spares and subsystems inside Israel. (Israel's 
total take from these last two categories of offshore FMS funds between 
FY 76 and FY 89 would come to $6.5 billion, much of it spent on the 
Merkava tank and the Lavi). Finally, Israel received vastly increased fun-
ding under some 18 to 20 DoD line items other than the FMS budget. 
This was the case, for example, with the 54 percent share it won in FY 87 
of the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Program appropriation; and with 
the funding of its ATBM system from the SDI budget, which would 




By the end of 1988, these and other programs had enabled Israel's 
defense industries to sell military goods worth at least $240 million to the 
United States—up from $9 million in 1983.34 When Secretary Shultz had 
addressed the annual convention of the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC) the previous year, he had had some grounds for his 
boast that, "America's support for Israel has never been stronger or 
more steadfast."" 
In December 1987, the flow of U.S. aid to the Israel military 
establishment was increased even higher, when Yitzhak Rabin, now 
Defense Minister, signed a further MOU with the United States, which 
formally designated Israel as a "major non-NATO ally". This category 
of states had been created by Congress the previous year. It was publicly 
listed as including Israel, Egypt, South Korea, Japan, and Australia; 
however, when the House of Representatives tried to list specific 
weapons systems to receive funding under this program, all six of these 
systems were Israeli. The terms of the December 1987 agreement 
reportedly included joint research and development programs, and fur-
ther American procurement of Israeli-manufactured military products." 
The Israeli government's achievement in gaining access to U.S. 
resources under the rubric of 'strategic collaboration' was all the more 
impressive since it occurred during a period when U.S.-Israeli relations 
were rocked by a number of developments that in the context of any 
country other than Israel would have proved extremely damaging in 
Washington. These included the Jonathan Pollard spy affair, which 
broke in November 1985; the involvement of Israeli officials in the 
'Irangate' scandal; and disagreements such as those over the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, Israel's military and other ties to South Africa, the 
massive cost over-runs (at the U.S. taxpayer's expense) on the Lavi, and 
Mordechai Vanunu's October 1986 revelations concerning the status of 
Israel's nuclear weapons program. 
With all these issues still in the news, one reporter judged in April 
1987 that, "March may have been the crudest month ever in U.S.-Israeli 
relations."" Nevertheless, political and diplomatic disagreements bet-
ween the two sides still seemed not to dent the ongoing strengthening of 
the strategic ties—even after the disagreement over the Arab-Israeli issue 
became more acute in 1988. 
In early 1988, one of the first achievements of the Palestinian in-
tifada was to bring Secretary Schultz back into the arena of Arab-Israeli 
peacemaking. This time round, one of his major objectives was to extract 
commitments from Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians that the "land-
for-peace' trade embodied in Security Council Resolution 242 applied on 
the West Bank and Gaza fronts. Israeli Premier Shamir refused to give 
such a commitment (as did, until December 1988, the PLO). Some of 
Shamir's domestic critics warned that his intransigence might affect the 
flow of American strategic goods to Israel, as had happened under 
earlier U.S. administrations: they were proved wrong. In April 1988, the 
Israeli defense producer Soltam was awarded a U.S. Army contract to 
supply mortars and ammunition worth up to $1 billion." That month, 
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too, a new strategic MOA was signed with Israel on the 40th anniversary 
of Israel's independence. 
These developments prompted Israeli defense analyst Dore Gold to 
question the relationship between the strategic-military and political-
diplomatic tracks in U.S.-Israeli relations. He judged that, under 
Reagan, 
strategic cooperation between Washington and 
Jerusalem developed on a separate track from the 
diplomatic relationship. As strategic ties with Israel 
came to be perceived as an American interest, it made 
no sense to condition their growth on diplomatic pro-
cess [progress?] in the area of Arab-Israeli 
negotiations." 
Part 3: Push and Pull Factors 
If the U.S. government was generally eager, under the two Reagan 
administrations, to strengthen the military aspects of its relationship with 
Israel, this feeling was also being strongly stimulated by the Israelis and 
some of their American friends. In 1977, power in Israel had passed out 
of the hands of the Labor Alignment which had dominated Israeli 
political life since Independence in 1948: from 1977 through 1984, the 
government was dominated by members of the rightwing Likud Bloc; 
and for four years thereafter, the country was ruled by a Likud-Labor 
coalition. Whereas Labor had traditionally had many supporters 
amongst both Jews and non-Jews in the liberal democratic camp in the 
United States, Likud's arrival in power in 1977 caused some American 
friends of Israel to fear that Israel was starting to lose its moral appeal. 
In late 1979, for example, the former President of the World Zionist 
Organization, Nahum Goldmann publicly expressed his regret that, 
"Israel is losing its moral qualification and is becoming only a small, ag-
gressive state, . . . thus losing the respect and the admiration of the 
larger part of world public opinion . . ."40 
In 1985, Jerusalem Post correspondent Wolf Blitzer recalled that, 
"It was not all that long ago when most Americans tended to cite 
primarily moral and emotional reasons for their support of Israel. . . 
The strategic basis for the American-Israeli alliance was seldom cited." 
He then described one of the factors that changed this situation: 
The case for stressing the strategic side of the story has 
intensified in recent years. Israeli officials themselves 
have encouraged this trend, fearing that the massive 
sums of U.S. military and economic assistance to Israel 
might cease to be acceptable to the American public and 
Congress unless explained in such a hardnosed way. If 
Israel were to be demonstrated to provide a useful 
military and strategic service to the United States on the 
other hand, the aid becomes justified on the basis of 
self-interest as well as national morality.4' 
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The Israeli government's lead in de-emphasizing Israel's moral ap-
peal to U.S. public opinion was followed by pro-Israeli American per-
sonalities such as former American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) director Morris Amitay, who at a 1983 conference declared 
that, "Moral authority has very little influence in politics. Few would at-
tempt to convince a congressman to vote for an aid bill for Israel with an 
appeal on behalf of Israel's 'moral authority'. Rather, I would make an 
appeal based on Israel's value."42 
Israel's strategic arguments were taken up with enthusiasm by Tom 
Dine, who succeeded Amitay as AIPAC Executive Director in 1980. 
Dine's first big fight on AIPAC's behalf was the 1981 campaign against 
the Saudi AW ACS deal. Though he lost that one, he immediately 
thereafter set about arming himself and his supporters with the kinds of 
arguments needed to ensure that AIPAC would never lose another big 
fight over a Mideastern strategic issue. He hired a former RAND Cor-
poration strategic analyst, Steven Rosen, as AIPAC's Director of 
Research and Information, and set Rosen and a stable of other strategic 
'experts' to work producing a glossy set of pamphlets advertising Israel's 
strategic 'virtues' to each of the American services.43 In the first of these 
pamphlets, Rosen concluded that, "Israel offers clear and substantial 
advantages as a prepositioning site for U.S. projection forces . . ." A 
later pamphlet argued to its U.S. Navy readers that, "Israel 
would . . . require no more than 1200 combat sorties to destroy the en-
tire Soviet fleet in the region . . . If Israel had no other concerns, this 
could be accomplished in a single day."44 
These kinds of arguments received a ready hearing in some parts of 
the State Department and the DoD—a fact that was all the more surpris-
ing since both these agencies had traditionally been concerned about the 
broader strategic costs to the United States of tying its defense posture 
too closely to that of Israel. What had changed in each of these two agen-
cies with the advent of the Reagan presidency was the appointment to 
high-level positions of a number of individuals who seemed pre-disposed 
to sympathize with the arguments of Israel's strategic salesmen. In the 
State Department these individuals included Secretary Haig himself, who 
encouraged the legitimation throughout the Department of the 'strategic 
Israel' argument, a phenomenon which to a significant extent outlived 
his tenure in Foggy Bottom. In the Pentagon, they included Assistant 
Secretary for International Security Policy (ISP) Richard Perle, and 
Deputy Under Secretary for Trade Security Policy Steven Bryen, who 
had previously been intensively investigated on suspicion of having hand-
ed secret Pentagon documents over to Israeli officials in Washington. 
While the ISP slot gave Perle no direct role in the formulation of Pen-
tagon policy on the Middle East, he nonetheless enjoyed much power 
within the building and was in a good position to help out his friends 
there, as well as to obstruct technology transfers to the Arab states of the 
Middle East. He and Bryen were for several years the U.S. represen-
tatives on NATO's technology transfer body, COCOM, which dealt with 
many matters of strategic interest to Israel. 
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The presence in crucial State, Pentagon and NSC slots, of in-
dividuals who were willing to sympathize with the Israeli government's 
battery of 'strategic' arguments provided essential agency-level backup 
to a President whose gut instincts were already deeply pro-Israeli. The ef-
fects of this combination on the way U.S. Mideast policy was made has 
rightly been described by writer Richard Straus as "revolutionary". 
Straus recalled that AIP AC s founder, IX. Kenen had described his 
organization's mission as being, "to lobby the Congress to tell the presi-
dent to overrule the State Department". Perceptively, Straus asked, 
"But what happens when the State Department doesn't need to be over-
ruled?"45 
Part 4: The Strategic Arguments Assessed 
One of the most comprehensive presentations of the case that a close 
relationship with Israel was in the strategic interests of the United States 
was presented in a Fall 1986 article in Orbis by Steven Spiegel.46 Spiegel 
wrote that, 
Israel can be viewed in the global military contest from 
five perspectives: its intelligence techniques, the implica-
tions of its battlefield experiences, the combination of a 
tight defense budget and a penchant for innovation, the 
effect of its activities on the calculations of Soviet plan-
ners, and the impact of its military performance on the 
reputation of U.S. arms.47 
His judgment was that, in each of these five fields, a close relationship 
with Israel offered clearcut benefits to the United States. One additional 
argument, not made by Spiegel but offered in a more apologetic spirit by 
other Americans favoring close strategic ties with Israel, was that such 
ties offered the United States more hope of being able to rein in an Israeli 
military establishment that might otherwise run out of U.S. control.4' 
These six arguments for close strategic ties thus need to be examined, 
Intelligence: 
Spiegel described Israeli intelligence as, "widely regarded as the best 
in the Middle East". "Shared information," he said, "has enabled the 
United States to save on training, deploying fewer intelligence operatives 
and utilizing fewer facilities."4* It was apparently true that in one of the 
cases he referred to, acquisition of Nikita Khrushchev's historic speech at 
the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress, Israel' Mossad intelligence 
organization played a crucial role. Some of the other achievements he 
cited were less clearcut. Warnings of possible assassination attempts 
against pro-Western Arab leaders such as King Hussein or Anwar Sadat, 
for example, have always been two-a-penny, and have come from many 
other quarters as well as Israel. 
Reliance on Israel to be the United States' eyes and ears in the Mid-
dle East was something the U.S. intelligence community never was 
prepared to accept, despite the decades-long relationship between the 
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Mossad and the CIA's former chief of counter-intelligence, James 
Angleton.50 Indications that reliance on Israeli intelligence might be 
damaging for the United States were never stronger than during the 
Lebanon crisis of summer 1982, when Secretary Haig appeared to take at 
face value General Sharon's claims that he could rout the PLO and in-
stall a pro-Western government in Beirut without causing any disruption 
to Western interests in the region. 
1982 was not the first occasion Israeli intelligence had failed badly. 
In his book-length history of the Israeli army, Ze'ev Schiff noted that, 
while the Aman military intelligence organization (long considered the 
flagship agency of the Israeli community) had registered several signifi-
cant achievements since Israeli Independence, it had also been responsi-
ble for some serious failures. These included its failure to use available 
information in order to predict the Arabs' 1973 offensive.51 
American officials involved in the strategic collaboration with Israel 
give Israel varying amounts of credit in the intelligence field. In Spring 
1988, Director of the DoD Office of Net Assessments Andrew Marshall 
judged that it was valuable for the United States, "to share the Israelis' 
understanding of the governments and societies of the region."52 
"Where is the line of their effectiveness?" asked another DoD official. 
"The closer in any area is to them, the better their intelligence is; and the 
further away, the spottier it is. But we have to remember that their 
assessments reflect their national goals, so Americans should always hold 
them up to a strong light."53 
Another American defense analyst, working on a Congressional 
staff, judged that Israeli intelligence had been, "No good since Sharon 
came in as Defense Minister." He claimed that Sharon had so politicized 
the process of intelligence collection and distribution that many of 
Israel's most experienced intelligence analysts had quit, and others were 
severely demoralized from internal infighting. In this sense, he judged 
that the Pollard affair, which revealed serious mismanagement of the 
Israeli intelligence-gathering process at the highest levels, "was only one 
symptom of the malaise of Israeli intelligence."5* 
According to some reports, this situation improved somewhat after 
Sharon's departure from the Defense Ministry. Nonetheless, the picture 
that emerges from informed Israeli accounts, plus a realistic assessment 
of U.S. interests throughout the region, indicate that for the United 
States to plan for the long term on 'saving' resources by relying on Israeli 
intelligence in the Middle East would pose a serious risk to its ability to 
adopt informed and independent policies based upon American national 
interests. 
Lessons Learned from Israel's Battlefield Experience: 
Spiegel wrote that this experience demonstrated, "the relative utility 
or weaknesses of established weapons", and revealed, "the latest in-
novations of the Soviets".55 This last claim is largely unfounded, since 
the Soviets have always been much more conservative about transfering 
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their state-of-the-art military technology to friends in the Middle East 
than has the United States. The result of this imbalance was that, during 
the 1982 Lebanon fighting, for example, the Israelis learned a lot about 
spooking the radars of Soviet-built SA-6 missiles in the Bekaa Valley; but 
the SA-6 was a 15-year-old system, and in spooking it, the Israelis reveal-
ed much useful data to the Soviets concerning the capabilities of front-
line NATO systems such as the E-2C Hawkeye, the F-16 fighter, and the 
Shrike and other precision-guided missiles used." The diplomatically 
worded judgment of one high-level Pentagon official concerning the 
Israelis' compromise of NATO technology in this encounter was that, 
"Israel has a very special situation. We might have preferred to protect 
that technology until we were in a more sensitive situation."57 
Both the Soviets and the United States were able to learn lessons 
from the Bekaa air-defense battles that would help them in planning for 
the much broader-scale conventional front-line in Central Europe. But 
the Soviets' lessons were more valuable, and were acquired at smaller 
cost in terms of compromise of their own systems, than those the United 
States was able to learn. Meanwhile, as one DoD official monitoring the 
strategic relationship with Israel reported, the lessons Israel's battle ex-
periences provide for U.S. force planners are "earned the hard way" in 
terms of other U.S. inducements. "We do get some useful lessons from 
Israeli experience," one non-Pentagon defense analyst familiar with the 
region observed. "But we have to extract them with difficulty. And the 
cost to us is tremendous."" 
Israel's Tight Defense Budget and Innovation: 
Spiegel wrote that this, "creates intriguing solutions to conventional 
defense problems at lower costs."" At some levels of technology this 
might be true. However, at the higher-technology end of the spectrum, 
the creativity of the Israeli defense industry has on occasion seemed to be 
directed more to creative book-keeping—of the kind that in the context 
of American defense contractors has repeatedly aroused the ire of the 
U.S. Congress—than to actual defense solutions. 
A prime exemplar of this phenomenon was provided by the ill-fated 
Lavi project. Originally conceived in the mid-1970s by Air Force Com-
mander Ezer Weizman as a small, light general-purpose plane, by 1982 
the concept had developed serious specification-ballooning, analogous to 
that which plagued the American F-16 project. Under Israel Aircraft In-
dustries (IAI) chief Moshe Arens, the Lavi was re-conceived with a 
heavier, more costly engine and a correspondingly heavier, more costly 
avionic payload.60 With the U.S. Congress regularly and uncritically ap-
propriating FMS funds for the project, costs ballooned to the point 
where the IAI management itself was unable to keep track of them. By 
April 1986, IAI chief David 'Ivri was reporting the fly-away price of the 
Lavi as, "between $13.5 million and $15.5 million" per plane." 
However, two months before that, a team of U.S. cost analysts headed 
by an experienced DoD systems analyst, Deputy Under-Secretary Dov 
Zakheim, had concluded that the real cost of the program, based on an 
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initial product run of 300 planes, would be $13 billion—that is, around 
three times the per-plane figure mentioned by 'Ivri." 
Zakheim later argued that the whole affair, and the formal strategic 
cooperation that had allowed close American scrutiny of the project, 
would ultimately prove beneficial to Israeli security, since they subjected 
Israel's military R&D establishment for the first time to such cost-
scrutiny procedures, which were much more rigorous than anything the 
Israelis themselves had in place.63 Whatever the value of this argument, 
the Lavi affair, and the $1.3 billion it cost the U.S. taxpayer between 
1980 and 1986, could scarcely be said to have been in the interests of the 
United States.64 Spiegel's contention that, "the United States inevitably 
benefits in its larger [defense] programs from sharing Israeli concepts 
and ideas" would thus seem open to serious challenge." 
The Effect of Israeli Activities on Soviet Planners: 
Spiegel could actually have made a better case than the one he made 
in this article, since one focus of intense concern to Soviet planners is the 
question of Israel's nuclear capabilities.** However, Spiegel, like most of 
Israel's other American supporters remained absolutely silent about 
Israel's nuclear capabilities. The first argument he adduced was that of 
the lessons learnt during the Bekaa Valley battles between Israel and 
Syria in 1982. His judgment concerning the air defense battle was that, 
"both sides learned valuable lessons . . . but the Western powers still 
have the advantage," and even that, "about 20 percent of [the Soviets'] 
entire defense budget" had had its effects nullified when their front-line 
air defense systems were compromised in the Bekaa.*' However, he bas-
ed this argument on the premise that the Syrians had front-line Warsaw 
Pact systems destroyed during the Bekaa fighting, which they did not; in 
fact, the 'balance of lessons' learned from this engagement was not in the 
West's favor (see above). 
The second argument Spiegel adduced seemed more valid, and has 
formed the basis for more visible U.S. coordination with the Israeli 
military than has the air-defense issue. This argument concerned Israel's 
naval and air capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean, as noted in the 
AIP AC paper quoted earlier. Interviews with serving and former DoD, 
State Department and NSC analysts reveal that for the United States, the 
collaboration in the Eastern Mediterranean has seemed the most 
beneficial element of the strategic cooperation with Israel. 
The Eastern Mediterranean, however, is not an area of primary 
strategic concern to U.S. strategic planners. As one defense analyst on 
Capitol Hill described it, "The East Mediterranean is a sideshow to the 
Persian Gulf oilfields or the Suez Canal."68 Another analyst (formerly 
with the NSC) portrayed U.S.-Israeli collaboration in the Eastern 
Mediterranean as important in providing air cover to the United States' 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) with the Gulf. However, a high-
level Pentaton official dealing with these issues judged baldly that the 
United States, "cannot use the Eastern Mediterranean cooperation with 
Israel with respect to the Gulf region."6* This judgment seems realistic, 
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since not only would direct military involvement with Israel be rejected 
by all of the Gulf states under now-foreseeable circumstances, but also 
Israel itself would likely be unwilling to divert substantial assets away 
from its own immediate defense in a major East-West confrontation. In 
the one major military task that the United States did face in the Gulf in 
1987-88, namely the protection of the re-flagged Kuwaiti tankers, it was 
notable that the Pentagon did not choose to call upon any help from 
Israel. 
Thus, while the naval collaboration in the Eastern Mediterranean 
became the most visible of the United States's joint strategic ventures 
with Israel, the contribution it made to the worldwide U.S. military plan-
ning was still extremely limited. This was particularly the case since Israel 
has never entered into any treaty obligation to commit its forces to the 
Western effort in the event of a global war against the Soviet Union. And 
indeed, as veteran military assistance analyst Harry Shaw pointed out, 
"Israelis are . . . consistently hesitant to spell out the circumstances 
under which Israel would be willing to risk fighting Soviet forces when it 
has a choice in the matter."70 
Israel's Military Performance and the Reputation of U.S. Arms: 
This point is primarily of interest to those who seek to maximize 
U.S. military sales worldwide. However, many even in this group ques-
tion Spiegel's implied claim that Israel's actions are of net benefit to the 
U.S. arms industry. The major problem, according to nearly all the U.S. 
officials interviewed, has been that though Israel's battlefield perfor-
mance may have enhanced the reputation of U.S. arms, nevertheless 
Israel's political actions have ensured that few third world countries can 
afford to buy these arms, however great their reputation. 
The problem here lies in Israel's tendency to gobble up most of the 
available FMS money, which is what the United States uses to lend to 
that majority of those customers who cannot (as the Saudis can) pay cash 
for their purchases. In FY 86, for example, Congressional earmarking of 
FMS funds for particular countries, including Israel, still left around $2 
billion for the Pentagon to allocate at its discretion.71 Two years later, 
that figure had shrivelled to between $200 and $300 million, according to 
one Pentagon analyst. He said that as a result, "strategically important 
countries such as Somalia have dropped off the map as far as Americans 
arms sales were concerned," and that Israel's earmarkings were largely 
to blame." Another veteran defense analyst estimated that the United 
States has had to stop giving security assistance to "some 30 or 40 coun-
tries" in order to keep the level of military aid to Israel and Egypt at the 
level that became institutionalized subsequent to Camp David. 
For his part, the Pentagon analyst did admit that the size of the 
funds appropriated by Congress for Israel's security assistance probably 
pushed up the total level of U.S. FMS sales worldwide, and had a certain 
"tailwind effect" in terms of the FMS sales to Egypt or other countries 
on the earmark list. "We don't object to the lack of flexibility we are left 
with in our worldwide planning." When Net Assessment's Andrew 
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Marshall was asked about the tailwind effect, he replied that, "My first 
impression is that Israeli arms aid gobbles up a large fixed amount of 
money. The main thing one hears is about the constraints on foreign aid 
money, and the amount which is earmarked for Israel and Egypt."73 
Links Increase American Control of Israeli Military Actions: 
One of the most forthright proponents of this argument, a former 
NSC analyst, was frank in admitting that in the case of the 1981 MOU, 
"it never worked out that way, because of Lebanon." He explained that, 
"We didn't realize what we were dealing with in Sharon." His more 
modest version of what the United States might hope to achieve with the 
post-1983 iteration of strategic collaboration was that, "it might develop 
a stake in the relationship on behalf of both sides." However, he noted 
that while this had been shown to be true "to some extent" in the case of 
the Labour Alignment and the IDF, it had not been demonstrated so 
much in the case of Likud.74 
That this analyst's more modest version of the leverage dynamic 
might be the maximum the U.S. could expect out of the relationship 
seemed to be indicated in a presentation given in July 1986 by Menachem 
Meron, who had seen service both as a military attaché in the Israeli Em-
bassy in Washington and as Director-General of Israel's Ministry of 
Defense. Referring to the 1981 MOU, Meron said that, "Washington 
believed that because of the MOU, there would be no more 'surprises' or 
unilateral moves on Israel's part. That was very far from the Israeli 
perception." Referring to the difference between the 1981 and 1983 ver-
sions of collaboration, he gloated that, "there was the realization that 
local powers can, in some cases, possess inherent advantages over a 
superpower.'"5 
Some systematic consideration should also be given, however brief-
ly, to the actual and potential downside costs to the United States of the 
close strategic relationship with Israel. The relationship has, as noted 
above, resulted in some compromise of U.S. and NATO military 
technology and operations to the Soviets. One must also assume that, 
since no intelligence community anywhere can be considered leakproof, 
there is a serious chance that close intelligence coordination with Israel 
may have resulted in some compromise of intelligence data and methods 
to the Soviets. Certainly, the case of former Knesset aide Shabtay 
Kalmanovich, who was convicted in Tel Aviv District Court in December 
1988 on charges of spying for the Soviets, indicates that U.S. intelligence 
agencies should exercise extreme caution in what they share with an 
Israeli intelligence community already rent with malaise, and now also 
apparently penetrated by the Soviets.7* 
One high-level Pentagon official pointed out that risks of such com-
promise exist in any alliance relationship. But he noted that Israel dif-
fered from other U.S. allies both because of the special aggressivity of 
the Israeli defense industry in acquiring advanced U.S. technology, and 
because of the existence of a strong political push factor, coming from 
organized public opinion and from the U.S. Congress, that has pushed 
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successive administrations into close strategic ties with Israel. This of-
ficial considered, however, that the principal downside cost to U.S. na-
tional security from the relationship with Israel stemmed from the extent 
this relationship curtailed U.S. links with the moderate Arab states. He 
added further significant nuance to this view when he noted that, "Deal-
ing with Israel on issues of arms transfers to the Arabs is one matter; but 
the real difficulties come from dealing with a Congress which on this 
issue is more pro-Israeli than the Israelis themselves."" 
Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary for International Security 
Affairs (ISA), noted that one result of Congressional and public pressure 
against arms sales to Arab countries has been that pro-Western Arab 
states became less stable because of the fear engendered by their inability 
to obtain their basic defense needs from the United States. In several 
cases, they have also turned elsewhere for the systems they wanted—a 
development the United States also regards as less stable, because other 
countries' weapons come with fewer follow-on controls. "We end up los-
ing political capital in the Middle East," he concluded. "We lose actual 
capital, and we lose influence. Because of these factors, and also because 
of the lack of control over some Arab weapons systems, the whole area is 
slightly less stable.'"' 
Part 5: Out of Synch 
It was an irony of history that, in precisely the same period when 
Israel's 'strategic salesmen' in the United States were having their biggest 
impact on official U.S. policy (1983 through 1987), the strategic studies 
community in Israel itself was wracked by a debate of the first impor-
tance, whose net effect was to call into question many of the basic 
assumptions that were still accepted by the 'strategic salesmen' in 
Washington. Many of the latter, however, continued their work seeming-
ly untramelled by self-doubt. 
The strategic debate in Israel was part of the deep, national-wide 
soul-searching that accompanied and followed the erosion of the IDF's 
position in Lebanon (though some of its antecedents can be traced back 
before June 1982). In the debate, defense of the invasion of Lebanon was 
left primarily to its architect, Ariel Sharon. In May 1985, he was still 
listing the invasion's achievements as follows: 
—The PLO was eliminated as a major political and 
military element . . . The defeat of the PLO engendered 
the most positive effect in Judaea, Samaria [the West 
Bank] and the Gaza Strip . . . —Our deployment deep 
into Lebanon and on the flank of the Damascus plain in 
effect destroyed the Syrians' ability to attack us in the 
Golan as well . . . 
—Our real political and strategic situation . . . has im-
proved immeasurably79 
These judgments concerning the invasion were challenged by the 
conclusions reached by many other Israeli strategic thinkers, both inside 
and outside the military. For example, as early as September 1982, Aman 
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chief Yehoshua Saguy had judged that, "The Syrians have not been 
substantively weakened militarily . . . If we talk about numbers, equip-
ment and weapons, the Syrians have not been defeated. Moreover, they 
have been strengthened."10 In December 1982, noted Hebrew University 
military historian Martin Van Creveld judged that: 
By 1982 the IDF was, relative to its size, as well armed 
as any force the world has ever seen . . . 
In Lebanon, this combination of quantity with 
technological sophistication made it possible to avoid 
any kind of military thought. . . Commanded by the 
same officer who, in 1973, threw away the cream of the 
Golani Brigade in a pointless frontal attack against the 
Syrians on Mt Hermon, the IDF in Lebanon piled tank 
upon tank and gun upon gun. 
A command and control system superior to 
anything previously employed made it possible to 
achieve good interarm cooperation and, above all, spew 
forth vast amounts of ammunition to destroy the coun-
try which the IDF had allegedly come to save. 
The results, nevertheless, were disappointing. The 
traditional superiority of individual Israeli troops and 
crews over their opponents took a nosedive . . . " 
In 1983, the head of the General Staff's long-range planning branch, 
Col. 'Immanu'el Wald, produced a study that examined the historical 
antecedents of the IDF's failures in Lebanon. He noted that: "In the Six 
Day War [of 1967] the IDF beat more than three Arab armies, on three 
fronts, with an investment of only 6 percent of the GNP. In the Yom 
Kippur War (of 1973] the IDF was barely even against two armies, on 
two fronts, with double the investment. In the Lebanese War the IDF did 
not even manage to defeat one army, on one front, under optimal condi-
tions and with an investment of 18 percent of the GNP."" 
The following year, veteran intelligence analyst Zvi Lanir produced 
a study which concluded that, 
The utilization of the army in the Lebanese war was 
marked by an excess of force and overwhelming 
superiority in firepower. The enemy was to a certain ex-
tent outgunned rather than outmaneuvered, pounded 
into submission instead of being outflanked, and crush-
ed by siege instead of being overwhelmed by a war of 
movement . . . 
But in the final analysis, the basic contradiction of 
the war stemmed from the attempt to achieve Clausewit-
zian goals through the utilization of a military machine 
trained and indoctrinated to attain a decisive victory in a 
war of denial fought to protect the existence of the state. 
In the end, this threatened the attainment of the 
Clausewitzian goals themselves." 
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Lanir, like many other Israeli strategic thinkers in this 'post-
Lebanon' period, sought to re-examine the deepest foundations of Israeli 
doctrine. "Israeli doctrine is in crisis," he stated in an interview in July 
1987. He attributed this crisis to the fact that, "the state has had no 
clearly defined war aims in any of its wars since 1956 . . . " He judged 
that the experience of the Middle East war of that year had demonstrated 
to Premier David Ben-Gurion that it would be impossible for Israel to 
impose peace on its neighbors through political means. "This led to the 
shift to the doctrine without political aims." Lanir recalled that since 
1979, he himself had considered that the regional environment had 
changed sufficiently that Israel could now think of making peace with its 
neighbors. But the official doctrine, "never caught up."'4 
Some of the most hallowed tenets of Israeli strategy and operational 
art also came under the microscope. Professor Dan Horowitz recon-
sidered the value of Israel's traditional manpower policy of remaining 'A 
national in arms', and only after careful weighing of the pros and cons 
did he come to the conclusion that it remained appropriate." A general 
from the Defense Department's Yad Tabenkin think-tank wrote that the 
mythic Israeli military concept of the large-scale 'breakthrough' was now 
redundant.*6 The IDF's time-honoured tradition that commanders 
should always Mead from the front' came in for some serious criticism.'7 
There were also many discussions about the financial costs of maintain-
ing Israel's huge defense establishment." 
Israel's strategic thinkers turned their attention, as well, to their 
country's burgeoning strategic relationship with the United States. For 
his part, Sharon maintained in an interview that, "Both sides have no 
alternative. The United States has no ally like Israel, and vice versa." He 
explained that, whereas Soviet power was balanced in Europe by NATO, 
and in Asia by the Chinese, "the only place where there is no organiza-
tion dedicated to this end is the Middle East. The counter-Soviet balance 
here is provided by Israel."" 
Other Israeli strategic thinkers evinced a more nuanced appreciation 
of the relationship. Ze'ev Schiff, of Ha'aretz, wrote that, 
The deepening of the [U.S.-Israeli] strategic ties, 
together with the growth in aid, has created, perhaps in-
evitably, a sense of over-confidence in many Israelis, the 
belief that what exists between the two countries today 
can be taken for granted . . . Even if Israel were to shun 
friendly advice from Washington and ignore U.S. in-
terests, according to this belief, there would be no 
American reaction . . . There are some extremist 
groups in Israel who believe that the U.S. cannot afford 
to desert Israel, regardless of what the latter does." 
The Jaffee Center's Shai Feldman, meanwhile, judged in a 1988 in-
terview that the strategic links with the United States had brought great 
benefits to Israel, both materially and in terms of an enhancement of 
Israel's capacity to deter its foes. "But there have been costs," he added. 
"There has been the perception of Israel elsewhere in the world as being 
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allied to an imperial power; and the overwhelming benefits of the 
alliance have enabled Israel to avoid difficult choices." Feldman said he 
considered that, despite the huge growth in the strategic dimensions of 
the relationship, its core remained the essentially moral argument based 
on Israel's democratic character. "The strategic arguments are the 
frosting on the cake, but the moral arguments are the cake itself," he 
said." This judgment was underlined in an April 1988 analysis by the 
Jaffee Center's Dore Gold, who wrote that, 
American strategic assets around the world like Turkey, 
Pakistan, the Philippines or Honduras receive aid in 
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. Israel's ability to 
receive billions of dollars does not emanate from 
strategic considerations alone.92 
CONCLUSIONS 
The emphasis on Israel's strategic benefits to the United States, as 
opposed to 'merely' its moral worth, was one of the President Reagan's 
fundamental beliefs when he came into office in 1981; and from his 
earliest days in the White House, the strategic tie with Israel became an 
operational leitmotif of his administration's policy in the Middle East. 
During Reagan's first two years in office, however, the relationship 
went through a number of stormy periods, with the disagreements com-
ing to a head over the issue of the scale of Israel's June 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon. On the key question of General Sharon's desire to prevail over 
the Syrians in the eastern sector, as well as the western and central sectors 
of Lebanon, Reagan finally insisted on Israel's compliance with the 
ceasefire the United States wanted to bring about in the east.'1 When 
Haig, by contrast, tried to allow Sharon more time to succeed in the east, 
he lost the President's confidence. The lack of U.S. confidence in Sharon 
over the June 1982 fighting, along with other disagreements over 
Lebanon including the events of mid-September 1982, continued to sour 
the bilateral relationship for some months thereafter. It was only after 
Sharon was replaced as Israeli Defense Minister by Moshe Arens, and the 
United States had started to experience its own difficulties in Lebanon, 
that the relationship began to sweeten again in the Spring of 1983. 
The strategic collaboration that was launched at the end of 1983 
then ushered in a five-year period that brought to Israel considerable 
strategic and economic benefits, that were apparently de-linked from 
Israel's compliance with U.S.-defined norms of political or diplomatic 
behavior. How had this come about, and what would be the lasting effect 
of this development on the relationship between these two states? 
If Richard Straus's model is accepted, then the two key changes 
came when the United Stated had first a President, and then a Secretary 
of State, who no longer needed to be pushed by Congress and the pro-
Israel lobby because they believed that the United States was a net 
beneficiary of strategic value in its relationship with Israel. The first of 
these changes occurred the day Ronald Reagan stepped into the White 
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House. The second would have come about with Alexander Haig's 
tenure at State, except that this was cut short by the disagreements of 
1982, which brought George Shultz to the State Department in his place 
(and also left Reagan seriously angry with Israel for a short while). By 
October 1983, as noted above, the Israelis had succeeded not only in 
restoring Reagan's traditional view of Israel's strategic allure, but also in 
persuading George Shultz that his best interests lay in pursing the 
strategic link as well. 
Several explanations for Shultz's turnaround have already been 
discussed. An additional reason, as mentioned by several Reagan ad-
ministration officials, may have been that Shultz saw some benefit in 
demonstrating his 'machismo' on the anti-Syrian issue, at a time when he 
was still battling hard to over-ride Secretary of Defense Weinberger's 
unyielding stance on the larger issue of relations with the Soviet Union. 
Building up the strategic ties with Israel would also have helped Shultz 
defuse the criticism aimed against him and his Department by powerful 
conservative and neo-conservative figures in Congress, who strongly sup-
ported the arguments of Israel's strategic salesmen. 
With the October 1983 NSDD, State and the White House then suc-
ceeded in 'boxing in' a reluctant DoD into the strategic relationship. 
Though many in the Pentagon still viewed the relationship with extreme 
scepticism, they now saw no realistic way to avoid it. They thus decided 
to continue working within its formal framework in order to limit its 
negative fallout as much as possible, while garnering from it what 
benefits they could—such as, for example, increased Congressional sup-
port for SDI and other controversial big-ticket defense budget items. For 
example, in May 1988, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci told AIPAC's 
annual conference that, *'Those who consider themselves friends of 
Israel and who want to cut SDI funding should be asked how they plan to 
meet Israel's security needs in a changing and more threatening military 
environment. "?4 
The role of Congress in all this deserves special mention, for by the 
mid-'80s Congress did not need to be pushed by what was everywhere 
referred to as simply "the Lobby", in order to tilt markedly toward 
Israel on a whole range of issues. Many members of Congress had long 
been used to applying different standards to actions undertaken by Israel 
and those undertaken by any other government, including their own, 
across a wide range of issues. In the 'strategic Israel' euphoria of the 
mid-'80s these double standards extended to clear cases of defense con-
tractor mismanagement (the Lavi affair), and nuclear proliferation (as 
evidenced by the Vanunu revelations). Nor did Congress's much-vaunted 
concern about the role of White House officials in the Iran-contra affair 
carry over into any sustained concern about the role of their Israeli co-
conspirators. The only issue that caused a momentary Congressional 
pause for thought amidst this euphoria was the question of Israeli arms 
sales to South Africa, but this was rapidly swept back under the rug after 
the Israeli government promised in 1987 that it would conclude no new 
arms agreements with the apartheid state. 
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The net effect of these developments at the policymaking level was 
that from late 1983 onwards Congress, the State Department and the 
White House were all competing with each other to confer strategic and 
economic benefits upon Israel's defense establishment. Each of these 
American institutions wanted a share of the action, and more important-
ly a share of the credit. Even the Defense Department sought to extract 
out of the situation whatever it could. Under these circumstances, the 
strategic relationship with Israel became a virtual political football for 
which different branches of the American policymaking establishment 
competed fiercely, while on occasion showing scant regard for the United 
States' broader national security interests. 
During the first Reagan administration, enthusiasm for the 
'strategic Israel' concept could be seen as the fruit of a marriage between 
two of that period's strong trends in American public and official opi-
nion: the long-established sympathy with Israel, and the same rise in a 
hawkish, confrontational view of international affairs that had 
catapulted Reagan into the White House. During Reagan's second term, 
this latter trend stalled, and then reversed. One result at the administra-
tion level was Shultz's victory in 198S-86 in steering Reagan into a renew-
ed arms control process with the Soviets. After Shultz had won this vic-
tory (and after the Democrats' victories in 1986's midterm congressional 
elections), he was no longer so dependent on the goodwill of hawkish 
pro-Israelis in Congress. 
This development had little immediate effect on the policies Shultz 
pursued toward the Israelis. As noted above, throughout 1987 he con-
tinued to confer military benefits on Israel while making little effort to 
rein back such frowned-upon Israeli actions as the creeping annexation 
of the occupied territories. Then, in early 1988, in response to the Palesti-
nian intifada, Shultz once again turned to Arab-Israeli peace-making. 
On this occasion, some of those who most publicly urged him to press 
Israeli Premier Shamir over the 'land for peace' issue were a group of 30 
Senators. The Senators, many of whom had long records as friends of 
Israel, expressed open dismay over Shamir's seeming intransigence on 
this issue." What appeared to be happening was a surprising rêverai of 
everything in the Straus formula: Congress and some influential parts of 
the American Jewish community now appeared to be pushing the State 
Department to press Israel to make concessions to the Arabs. 
The changes in the American Jewish community's relationship with 
Israel that had preceded this development have been examined elsewhere. 
Suffice it to say here that in early 1988 many parts of the American 
Jewish community felt it necessary to reaffirm the importance of the 
moral basis for their support for Israel. By then, it seemed that among a 
broad segment of American public opinion, including Jewish opinion, 
the strategic arguments for supporting Israel were having less and less of 
an effect, by comparison with the enduring moral factor. 
At the operational level within the administration, 1988 saw a 
slow but continued erosion of the reluctance to confront the Israeli 
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government that had been evident throughout the preceding years. In 
December 1988, Secretary Shultz finally made the judgment that the 
PLO had met the conditions set down in 1975 for beginning a dialogue 
with the United States. Despite the vociferous protests of Israel's 
political leaders, he instructed the U.S. Ambassador in Tunis to open the 
dialogue immediately. Signficantly, he won the quiet support of most 
significant American Jewish leaders for his action. 
Did those years of close U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation from 1983 
through 1988 bring any lasting benefit to the U.S. taxpayer? Had they 
received value for the $1.8-plus billion worth of resources the U.S. had 
pumped into the Israeli defense establishment in each of those years? 
Despite the Reagan administration's rhetorical and policy emphases on 
Israel's strategic worth, as Reagan left office the answer to this question 
still lay, in good part, within the 'soft' field of moral reasoning. Even the 
authoritative Pentagon official charged with running International 
Security Assistance, Assistant Secretary Richard Armitage, concurred 
with this view. He judged that the relationship could only be said to have 
given value to the U.S. if the moral imperative were added to the 
strategic judgement.96 
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